In this paper, we investigate reÿned deÿnition of random sequences. Classical deÿnitions (Martin-L of tests of randomness, uncompressibility, unpredictability, or stochasticness) make use of the notion of algorithm. We present alternative deÿnitions based on set theory and explain why they depend on the model of ZFC that is considered. We also present a possible generalization of the deÿnition when small inÿnite regularities are allowed. c 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Prolegomena
It is rather surprising that algorithms are involved for deÿning random sequences since probability theory does not use the notion of algorithm. Thus, we try in this paper to propose more general deÿnitions based only on set theory. We ÿrst explain why it is not so easy: we prove that perfect deÿnitions (based on the notion of provably null sets) cannot exist. Thus, we propose a weaker deÿnition. We observe that there is a model of ZFC (namely the Solovay model) in which our deÿnition gives a perfect notion of randomness. On the other hand, in all models of ZFC it gives a good notion of randomness. Our paper is not focused on set theory, we just use some known set theoretic results. We proposed that it is not necessary to be an expert on set theory to take advantage of new notions. Let us recall that our goal is to understand how far the notion of algorithm is necessary to deÿne randomness and what kind of other deÿnition can be or cannot be proposed.
Introduction
If somebody tells us that he has tossed a coin inÿnitely many times getting the sequence 0001000101000100000001000101000001000101010 : : : ;
where each even term is 0, we will most likely be ready to suspect fraudulence. Why? Our disbelief that the sequence is really random can be expressed in di erent terms: for instance, it contains too much regularities to be really random, or that it is "predictable", 3 or that it has more zeros than ones thus violating the Law of Large Numbers, but essentially any explanation amounts to the following: the sequence is not random because it belongs to a simply deÿned set of strings of Lebesgue measure 0.
Towards more rigorous presentation, let us deÿne = 2 N ; the set of all inÿnite binary sequences. The Lebesgue, or uniform, measure in , denoted by mes, is the product of N-many copies of the measure on the 2-element set {0; 1} giving the value 1 2 to both {0} and {1}. A null set is any set X ⊆ with mes X = 0. Complements of null sets, i.e., sets of measure 1, are full sets.
Coming back to the discussion above, we may conclude that a reasonable notion of a random element of must infer that random sequences avoid all "essential" null sets in ; or, what is the same, must belong to all "essential" full sets. The key issue is which sets should be viewed as "essential" here. Of course, these cannot be all (null and full) sets, because then there would be no random sequences at all. As a matter of fact, there is no other reasonable opportunity to provide the existence of random sequences except for taking a countable family E of "essential" subsets of : Then, we can deÿne a sequence x ∈ to be random in the sense of E i it avoids any null set X ∈ E. The set R of all random sequences is, of course, full. The larger the family E we take the more reÿned the notion of randomness we obtain and the stronger is our belief that any random sequence can be obtained by fair coin tossing.
An important deÿnition of this kind, given by Martin-L of [?] , is as follows. Let u denote the set of all inÿnite continuations of a ÿnite string u: Recall that A ⊆ is a null set if it can be covered by an open set (in Cantor's topology) of arbitrarily small measure, that is, for any n; there is a set B n of ÿnite strings such that (1) A ⊆ u∈Bn u and (2) u∈Bn mes( u ) = u∈Bn 2 −l(u) ¡1=n: A set A is called e ectively null if there exists a sequence B n satisfying (1) and (2) such that the set { u; n : u ∈B n } is recursively enumerable. According to Martin-L of, a sequence in is random if it avoids all 4 e ectively null sets. For instance, the sequence ( * ) above is not random: indeed, it belongs to the e ectively null set of all sequences x such that x(n) = 0 for all even n. Note that the family of all e ectively null sets is countable, as any its element is identiÿed by an algorithm and the number of algorithms is countable.
It turns out that usual laws of probability theory, e.g., the law of large numbers (the frequency of zeros among ÿrst n terms tends to 1 2 ) or the law of the iterated logarithm, are satisÿed by any Martin-L of random sequence, simply because the set of all counterexamples can be covered by an e ectively null set. Yet the Martin-L of deÿnition does not encounter all possible inÿnite regularities which a really random sequence should avoid. For instance, a simple diagonal construction yields a particular, deÿnable Martin-L of random sequence while our intuition refuses to accept any deÿnable sequence to be random.
The aim of our paper is to present more reÿned deÿnitions of randomness, in part known from modern set theory. We shall assume some surface acquaintance with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC, including a belief that it is an adequate foundation of mathematics. It will be a separate section (Section ??) which introduces some di erent opportunities in the study of the notion of randomness, related to invariant randomness.
Set theoretic approach to randomness
The Martin-L of deÿnition is an example of randomness deÿnitions which describe the "essential" null sets (i.e., those to be avoided) in terms of a ÿxed notion of deÿnability. (We treat "to be a r.e. set" as a kind of deÿnability.) Taking more broad concepts of deÿnability, we obtain, generally speaking, stronger notions of randomness. For instance, one deÿnes a sequence x ∈ to be arithmetically random i it avoids all arithmetically coded null sets (see Section ??). Then many Martin-L of random sequences, in particular all arithmetically deÿnable among them, become arithmetically non-random.
However, we shall still have hyperarithmetically deÿnable arithmetically random sequences. Moreover, whichever particular notion of deÿnability we take, there will be random, in this sense, sequences, deÿnable in some other sense. This persuades us to think how to incorporate the most general set theoretic deÿnability as a whole. In view of this discussion, a perfect notion (x) of a random sequence would be a notion satisfying two principles: (1) ZFC proves that the set of all random sequences is a full set. (2) For any formula (x) such that ZFC proves that the set {x ∈ : (x)} is null, it is provable, in ZFC, that no random sequence satisÿes (x). (Formula means a set theoretic formula unless otherwise indicated.) However Theorem 1. There is no formula satisfying both (1) and (2).
Proof. 5 Suppose that is such a formula. The argument is based on ideas connected with the G odel constructibility. G odel deÿned in 1938 a class L of sets called constructible sets and proved that L is a model of ZFC. The statement that all sets are constructible is called the axiom of constructibility and formally abbreviated by the equality V = L, where V denotes the universe of all sets. The axiom V = L was proved to be consistent with ZFC by G odel (the key fact is that V = L is true in the class L) and independent from ZFC by Cohen in 1961. 6 Here the most important property of L is that there is a well-ordering ¡ L of L, deÿnable by a concrete set theoretic formula.
Let (x) say the following: x ∈ is the ¡ L -least element x 0 of the set {x ∈ ∩ L : (x)}; if the latter is non-empty, and x(n) = 0 for all n otherwise. Obviously, ZFC proves that there is only one x ∈ satisfying (x); hence, by (2) , ZFC proves that (x) contradicts (x): However, the axiom V = L (which is consistent with ZFC) implies, by (1), 7 that there is a sequence x satisfying (x) and (x) -namely, the x 0 deÿned above.
This drawback can be ÿxed at the cost of employment of non-ZFC means. This can be, for instance, an appropriate class theory, as in [?] . Myhill (see [?] ) handled the problem adding to ZFC an extra atomic predicate of randomness and some axioms which govern its use. Another, even more exotic opportunity is to employ a nonstandard set theory extending ZFC, to deÿne a sequence to be random i it avoids any standard null set, as in Ref. [?] .
However, our requirements should be moderated, as long as we keep commitment not to leave the ZFC ground. Our proposal to this end, which seems to be a new one, is to consider the following weaker form of principle (2): (2 ) For any formula (x), if ZFC proves the set {x : (x)} to be null, then ZFC does not prove that there is a random sequence satisfying (x). Informally, the principle states that no one will ever prove that a particular law of probability theory is not satisÿed by some random sequence. In particular, any notion of random sequence satisfying (2 ) is resistant to the above critics of Martin-L of randomness. These are, however, not all the requirements which we ÿnd necessary to impose on a notion of randomness. The point is that the principles (1) and (2 ) do not imply, that the sequence (say) 000000000000000 : : : is not random. Principle (2 ) implies, of course, that one cannot prove that it is random. But we expect that such laws as "not to be identically zero" should be proved. This leads us to the third principle: 5 A modiÿcation of an argument by Myhill which shows that (1) is incompatible with a stronger version of (2) saying that, for any set theoretic formula (x); ZFC proves that if the set {x ∈ : (x)} is full then all random sequences satisfy (x): The argument ÿrst appeared in [?, p. 321], see [?] for more on Myhill's approach. 6 We refer to [?,?] in matters of all general set theoretic facts used below as well as in matters of the history of related set theoretic research. 7 We actually need only that ZFC proves the existence of at least one random sequence.
(3) ZFC proves that any random sequence is arithmetically random, hence, Martin-L of random, too. We face here the same problem: the choice of arithmetical randomness, as the bottom level, is not well motivated. However, our construction applies to any previously speciÿed amount of deÿnability: for any deÿnable provably countable family of provably null sets there is a notion of randomness satisfying (1) and (2 ), and such that it is provable that any random sequence avoids all those sets.
Our main result (see Section ??) will be a notion of randomness which satisÿes (1), (2 ), (3). This notion will comprise two distinct notions: the Solovay randomness and the arithmetical randomness. The key point is that it is consistent that the Solovay randomness satisÿes both (1) and (2) . This allows to deÿne the "aggregate" notion by cases, i.e., as the Solovay randomness whenever it satisÿes (1) and (2), and the arithmetical randomness otherwise. This will result in a notion of randomness also satisfying the common closure properties, for instance, stable with respect to ÿnite changes.
Solovay random sequences
The aim of this section is to describe a notion of randomness which has the following properties, apparently even stronger than those of (1) and (2), but only in the sense of consistency:
The set of all random sequences is a full set. (2 * ) For any formula (x); if the set {x ∈ : (x)} is null then no random sequence satisÿes (x). It immediately follows from Theorem ?? that there is no set theoretic formula which, provably in ZFC, satisÿes (1 * ) and (2 * ). Yet there is a notion of randomness which consistently satisÿes (1 * ) and (2 * ). Recall that countable intersections of open sets are called G sets. Let us say that a sequence of sets B n of ÿnite binary sequences is a code for a G set U ⊆ i U = n u∈Bn u ; where, as above, u = {x ∈ : u ⊂ x}.
Deÿnition 2.
A sequence x ∈ is Solovay random over L i it avoids any null G set with a code in L, the class of all G odel constructible sets.
The formula saying that x ∈ is Solovay random over L is denoted by L (x). Put R L = {x ∈ : L (x)} (all Solovay random over L sequences).
In fact, it will not be di erent to say: whenever X ⊆ is a null Borel set with a code in L. 8 Indeed, it is a classical fact of measure theory that any null Borel set X ⊆ can be covered by a null G set U ⊆ : The construction of the covering set U can be maintained e ectively enough to show that any null Borel set coded in L can be covered by a null G set coded in L.
It occurs that basic properties of R L depend on the structure of the set universe: ZFC alone does not prove much, so that one either considers special models or proves consistency theorems. In particular, it is consistent with ZFC that R L is empty, just because R L = ∅ is a (trivial) consequence of the axiom of constructibility V = L. On the other hand, we have Theorem 3 (Solovay) . It is consistent with ZFC that the formula L (x) satisÿes both (1 * ) and (2 * ).
Proof. The method of proof will be to demonstrate that L (x) satisÿes (1 * ) and (2 * ) in a particular model of ZFC, called the Solovay model [?] .
To obtain this model, one has to ÿx an inaccessible cardinal # in the constructible universe L. Then one deÿnes a generic extension of L, which is a model of ZFC where each ordinal ¡# is made countable by adding an appropriate collapse function f : N onto = {ÿ : ÿ¡ }. The model has a lot of applications in set theory, for instance, it is true in this model that all projective sets of sequences are Lebesgue measurable. This result is based on the following key fact (we refer to [?,?] for proof): Proposition 4. In the Solovay model, if a set X ⊆ is deÿnable by a set theoretic formula containing only sets in L as parameters then there is a Borel set B ⊆ with a code (see footnote 8) 
The following lemma is another key ingredient of the proof of Theorem ??. Lemma 5. In the Solovay model, R L is a full G set.
Proof. Codes for G sets, deÿned above, can themselves be e ectively coded by sequences in : Thus, it su ces to prove that the set ∩ L of all constructible sequences is countable in the Solovay model.
To show this recall that ℵ 1 is the least uncountable cardinal, or, that is the same, the least cardinal bigger than ℵ 0 = card N; the countable cardinality. By ℵ Thus, in the Solovay model, R L has full measure, so that every set of sequences, deÿnable by a formula with parameters in L, is a Borel set modulo a null set-hence, it is Lebesgue measurable. (This remains true even if we allow, in addition, arbitrary parameters in in deÿnitions of sets.) In other words, we have (1 * ). We easily prove (2 * ), too. Indeed, suppose that, in the Solovay model, X ⊆ is a null set, deÿnable by a formula containing only sets in L as parameters. By Proposition ??, we can assume that X is a Borel null set, coded in L. It follows from observation after Deÿnition ??, that X is covered by a null
The use of the Solovay model in this proof needs to be commented upon. Recall that the construction of this model starts with a model with an inaccessible cardinal. It is known that the existence of such a cardinal cannot be proved in ZFC, moreover, it implies the formal consistency of ZFC, so that a set theory with an inaccessible cardinal is much stronger than ZFC. Therefore, it is important to ÿgure out whether the existence of inaccessible cardinal can be eliminated from the proof of Theorem ??.
In many similar cases, the use of inaccessible cardinals is unavoidable (sometimes it is very di cult to prove this!), but in this case the Solovay model can be replaced by a model not based on inaccessibles. One of them is a model obtained as an extension L[f] of the constructible universe L by a generic map f : N onto ℵ L 1 . Another one, much more sophisticated but not using a cardinal collapse (which means that all L-cardinals remain cardinals in the extension) is described in [?, p. 315]. (We shall not stop at set theoretic details related to those models.) Neither of the two needs inaccessible cardinals or anything else beyond ZFC. However, the Solovay model has another advantage.
Indeed, consider the notion of relative standardness, which naturally arises in the study of some probabilistic phenomena like the Fubini theorem (see [?] ). This would be a binary formula R(x; y) (reads: x is random relative to y) satisfying the two following requirements (1 • ) If y ∈ then the set {x : R(x; y)} is a full set. 
The "consistent" randomness
Recall that a code for a G set is, as deÿned in Section ??, essentially a subset of S × N; where S is the set of all ÿnite binary sequences. Let us ÿx a recursive bijection ÿ : S × N onto N. Say that a G code C is arithmetically deÿnable i its ÿ-image c is an arithmetical subset of N in the ordinary sense, i.e., it can be deÿned by a formula written in terms of addition and multiplication, with quantiÿers over natural numbers. Let us say that a set G ⊆ is an arithmetically coded G set i it has an arithmetically deÿnable code.
Deÿnition 6. A sequence x ∈
is an arithmetically random i it avoids any null arithmetically coded G set. 9 The formula saying that x ∈ is arithmetically random is denoted by A (x) Put R A = {x ∈ : A (x)} (all arithmetically random sequences).
One easily proves, in ZFC, that R L ⊆ R A , or, in other words, L (x) implies A (x). Unlike R L , the set R A is, provably in ZFC, a set of full measure. Clearly any Martin-L of random sequence x ∈ belongs to R A .
Let (x) be the formula saying: • x ∈ R A , and if R L is a set of full measure then x ∈ R L . Thus deÿnes the set R L of all Solovay random sequences over L-provided this is a set of full measure, while otherwise it deÿnes simply the set R A of all arithmetically random sequences. It easily follows that satisÿes (1) and (3) . To see that (x) also satisÿes (2 ), consider a set theoretic formula (x) such that ZFC proves that it deÿnes a null set. By Theorem ??, it is consistent with ZFC that L satisÿes (1*) and (2*) hence (x) ⇔ L (x). It follows that ∀x ( (x) ⇒ ¬ (x)) also is consistent, so that ZFC does not prove that there is a random sequence x satisfying (x).
Invariant randomness
Any reasonable notion of randomness of a sequence in (including those considered above) informally amounts to the requirement that the sequence cannot include inÿnite regularities of some kind. What happens if we do not mind to allow "small" inÿnite regularities? Let is make a few steps in this direction.
Let I be an ideal on N whose elements (subsets of N) will be thought of as "small" inÿnite sets. The following examples are of interest: Fin = all ÿnite subsets of N; D = all density 0 subsets of N:
(A set X ⊆ N is of density 0 i the frequency of elements of X among ÿrst n natural numbers tends to 0 as n tends to ∞.) Deÿne E I to be the associated equivalence relation on , so that x E I y i the set {n : x(n) = y(n)} belongs to I : informally, x and y "di er not too much" from each other.
Note that E Fin is usually denoted by E 0 . If E is an equivalence relation on then let [x] E = {y : y E x} (the E-class of x ∈ ) and [X ] E = {y : ∃ x ∈ X (y E x)} and ]X [ E = C[CX ] E (the E-saturation and the E-kernel of X ⊆ ; CX is the complement of X , as usual). Any set X satisfying X = [X ] E is called E-invariant.
Let us take the arithmetical randomness as the basic notion, but the following deÿ-nition makes sense for any other one (e.g., the Solovay randomness).
Deÿnition 7.
Let E be an equivalence relation on . A sequence x ∈ is arithmetically E-invariant random i it avoids any set of the form ]X [ E , where X is a null arithmetically coded G set.
(It is not clear that this is equivalent to the requirement that x avoids any null E-invariant arithmetically coded G set: note that ]X [ E may be not Borel, even assuming that E; X are Borel.) The deÿnition makes sense formally for any equivalence relation E, but lacks motivation if E is not of the form E I . 10 Then "arithmetically random" is clearly the same as "arithmetically = invariant random" (the equality can be considered as an equivalence relation). Moreover, this is the same as "arithmetically E 0 -invariant random", because the E 0 -saturation [X ] E0 of any set X is the union of countably many simple shifts of X . On the other hand, the case of E D is di erent! Indeed, the set of all arithmetically E D -invariant random sequences is clearly E D -invariant. It follows that there is an arithmetically E D -invariant random sequence x such that x(2 n ) = 0 for all n: note that the set {2 n : n ∈ !} belongs to D! Such an x is not arithmetically random, of course. Thus, arithmetically random sequences form a proper subclass of arithmetically E D -invariant random ones. In fact, for any arithmetically random x there exist many arithmetically E D -invariant random but not arithmetically random sequences y E D x. We would be interested to know if any arithmetically E D -invariant random y satisÿes y E D x for some arithmetically random x.
Another question is how the known forms of relationship between ideals over N re ect in the associated notions of invariant randomness.
